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The present paper presents a survey of the main works that analyze
labor share dynamics from a theoretical point of view. It tries also to
reconcile the dierent approaches to the issue into a unifying framework
represented by the so called VN schedule.
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1 Introduction
Labor share dynamics has been viewed as a minor concern in the years before
the actual crisis. Despite in many European countries income distribution was
increasingly favouring capital, this fact got little attention since in the neoclassi-
cal view factor share stability was considered, quoting Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(2003) "as a granted stylized fact of growth".
The wake and upsurge of the current global crisis has brought back to the
front stage the need for a ﬁne tuning of the demand level. In this context
monetary policy proved to be ineective after years of primacy over ﬁscal policy
and of interest rate downhill run pursued to ﬁght previous recessions. There
is little room left for a bounceback of investments driven by reduced money
cost since the economy already hit the "zero lower bound" for interest rates.
The stimulus for a recover in economic activity then, must come also from an
increase in private consumption. Indeed increases in public spending ﬁnd sever
limitations in the need to rein in debt growth. It is worth then, to consider
which operating leverage are available for an increase in families’ disposable
income and for a rebalancing of income functional distribution that promotes a
resurgence in private consumption.
The paper has the following structure. Section 1 introduces the notion of
VN schedule which represent the main tool used in the analysis. Section 2 to 4
describe the labor share dynamics in the long, in the medium and in the short
run. Section 5 reports some criticism and improvement to the approach adopted.
Section 6 discusses the main issues related to international trade. Section 7 duly
concludes.
12 The VN Schedule
The determinants of labor share in the long-run general equilibrium, are de-
scribed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). These authors prove the existence
of a one-for-one relation between the labor share and the capital-output ratio
under the benchmark hypothesis of competitive markets, constant return to
scale production function and labor augmenting technical progress.
The relevance of the previous result, the so called VN schedule, relies on
the fact that it allows linking labor share movements to the variations of an
observed variable. The relation is unaltered by changes in factor prices (wage
and rental cost of capital), in quantities and by the eects of labor augmenting
technical progress; such variations result into movements along VN schedule.
Consider now how the VN schedule is derived. Start from the production
function that is deﬁned as follows:
\ = i (N>O · E)
where \ is total output, N and O are respectively the capital and the labor
stock employed in the production process, E is the labor augmenting technical
progress.
Exploiting the constant return to scale property it possible to adopt the
intensive form for the production function:






= N · i (o)
where o = O·E
N is the ratio between labor in e!ciency units and capital.
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Since the function i (o) is monotonic, it is also invertible and this allows







2Substituting for the previous expression in the equation of the labor share
gives:
VO = k(n) · i
0
(k(n)) · n
that is a sole function of the capital-output ratio and deﬁnes the VN schedule.
Characterizing how the labor share responds to variation in n, is a relevant




































































It is possible then, to express VO










































Substituting  in the equation above gives:
VO
n







The relation between the labor share and the capital output ratio crucially
depends on the elasticity of substitution between productive factors; in par-
ticular, it is the case that, being i
00
(o)  0, if ||  1, i.e. if there is low
complementarity between capital and labor, the VN schedule has a negative
slope. Instead when there is strong complementarity and || ? 1, the VN
schedule has a positive slope.
33 Long-Run Dynamics
In the long-run then, variations in the values of the labor share across countries
or sectors are explained by dierent steady state levels of the capital-output
ratio and by dierent elasticities of substitution between labor and capital. The
variables n and  represent the main determinants of the VN schedule
The previous statement clearly holds if no shocks occurs aecting the tech-
nical features of the production function; these shocks indeed, cause a shift in
the VN schedule if they change the characteristics of i (o) in a non labor aug-
menting way. The most important factors that may cause a new VN schedule
to emerge are capital augmenting technical progress and shocks on the price of
imported goods employed in the production.
In the ﬁrst case the production function becomes \ = i (N · D>O · E) where
D denotes capital augmenting technical progress; the labor share reformulated
is then:
VO = k(Dn) · i
0
(k(Dn)) · Dn
It is easy to see that variations in the value of D shift the VN schedule.
Analogous results are found if imported intermediate goods, L, are included
in the production function:
\ = i (N>O · E>L)
since the labour share is not a sole function of the capital-output ratio any
more, but depends also on the real price of L.
4 Medium-Run Dynamics
The analysis of labor share movements in the medium and in the short run
requires considering additional factors other than capital augmenting techno-
logical progress and international price of imported goods. This is due to the
fact that if a short time span is considered, markets are hardly described as
competitive. Monopolistic competition prevails in the ﬁnal good market while
the bargaining between ﬁrms and trade unions deﬁnes the wage setting process
in the labor market.
It is the case then, that a wedge might temporarily exist between the mar-
ginal product of labor and the real wage. Any variation in the dierence between
these two variables causes the economy to move o the original VN schedule.
Only over time free entry on the good markets allows restoring the perfect com-
petition conditions.
The transition between dierent short or medium run equilibria is driven,
according to Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), by three types of variables that
are responsible for temporary movements of the economy o the VN schedule
and namely:
• Variations in the markup that ﬁrms apply on marginal costs.
4• Changes in the bargaining power of workers relative to that detained by
ﬁrms.
• Labor adjustment costs.
Dierent authors did study in detail the eects of each of these shocks. Blan-
chard (1997 and 1998) provides a simple and though eective framework that
allows an exhaustive analysis. based on the paper by Caballero and Hammour
(1997) and on the results of Phelps (1994).
The analysis adopts a simple model of monopolistic competition where ﬁrms
bargain with workers over the wage rate, Z, but detain the right to manage
their employment level. This means that ﬁrst the level of Z is set and then
ﬁrms adjust employment, acting as wage-takers.




(1 + ) = E · i
0
(o)
where  indicates the medium run level of the markup. This variable depends




The wage rate then, is no more equal to labor marginal productivity and the
dierence among the two quantities depends on the size of . Since is i
00
(o)  0
the labor demand function has the usual negative slope.
Consider how the wage rate is set. The bargaining process is characterized as
an asymmetric Nash bargaining whose outcome is the solution of the following
maximization problem:





(1 + ) = E · i
0
(o)
that is the optimality condition derived from the next stage where ﬁrms decide
the employment level; the variable } is a measure of the relative bargaining
power of workers, Y is the aggregate workers’ utility,  stands for ﬁrm proﬁts,
and the superscript r denotes the outside option available to the agents. It is
usually assumed that r = 0 while Y  Y r is deﬁned as follows:
Y  Y r = [x(Z)  xr]O
where x(Z) is individual utility from labor income and xr is the utility from
fully consuming the individual leisure endowment.
In order to describe this situation Blanchard (1997 and 1998) adopts the




5such that jO A 0 and j} A 0.








For given values of  and } it is possible to derive a VN schedule deﬁning a



















Consider now what happens in the labor market following a labor supply
shock, i.e. a change in the value of }. A variation in the workers bargaining
power results ultimately in a change in the relative price of labor with respect to
capital. If factor proportions are varied without incurring in adjustment costs,
this induces ﬁrms to adjust o = O·E
N until the previous equality holds again.
Suppose for instance that } rises. Employment, O, then is reduced causing
both an increase in i
0
(o) and a decrease in j(O>}); the opposite holds if } is
reduced. It is the case then, a change in factor prices simply causes a movement
along the VN schedule towards a dierent equilibrium value of n; in particular







N increases, n decreases while the opposite
happens if the labor-capital ratio decreases. The previous outcome crucially
depends on the assumption that the ﬁrms are wage-takers so that the wage rate
is always proportional to the marginal product of labor.
What can cause a shift of the VN schedule in this setting is a labour demand
shock1. It is easy to see that an increase in the markup causes a decrease of
the medium-run labor share for every given level of n; the opposite obviously
happens if  decreases. The slope of the schedule again depends on the elasticity
of substitution between productive factors.
The previous results are obtained under the crucial hypothesis that ﬁrms can
immediately and costlessly adjust factor proportions following a change in the
relative prices of capital and labor; this assumption is reasonable if a su!ciently
large time span is considered.
It is required further that monopolistic competition prevails in the ﬁnal good
market, a circumstance that it is never veriﬁed in the long run where the free
entry condition drives the markup down to zero.
The analysis combines then, elements that evoke the short run and others
that better ﬁt the long run; this characteristic restricts its application to a period
in time that adopting Blanchard’s deﬁnition2, corresponds to the medium run.
1An analysis of variations in  due tp labor demand shocks is included in Phelps (1994).
More recently Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) study the role respec-
tively of market concentration and openess to trade in the deﬁnition of the markup level.
2See Blanchard (1997).
65 Short-Run Dynamics
In real world economies adjustment costs are recognized as major determinants
of movement of the labor share3 and in particular, are deemed responsible for
the movement o the VN schedule that take place in the short run during the
transition between two dierent points on it.
An exhausting analysis of their eects is provided by the inﬂuential work
by Caballero and Hammour (1997), that introduce the hypothesis of putty-clay
technology in the previous setting. Firms face an ex-ante technological menu
at time w characterized by a CES production function with labor augmenting
technical progress:
i (N>O · E) = g
h
N1 1


















The previous expression can be thought as the envelope of many Leontief
production functions; each of them represents the ex-post production possibili-
ties of an individual ﬁrm.
In the short run then, the capital-labor ratio is ﬁx and a change in factor
proportions is possible only over time when new investments replace vintage
capital. Labor demand is inelastic and gives the opportunity to trade unions
to extract rents from the wage setting process. In particular, labor can ”ap-
propriate” a part of the remuneration due to capital exploiting limited factor
substitutability.
A simple way to look at this problem is to consider how the markup applied
to the real wage varies when workers bargaining power changes. Denote with ¯ o
and ¯ O respectively the ﬁx values of the capital-labor ratio and of labor demand;
















As } increases vu must decrease to restore the equilibrium in the labor
market and vice versa if workers’ bargaining power declines. A relevant feature
of the short run equilibrium is that the markup level does not depend only on
the characteristics of the demand for the ﬁnal good but is also determined in
the labor market.
In this context, a labor-supply shock causing a sudden rise in the wage rate
produces an increase in the labor share for a given n and a movement o the
medium run VN schedule. Firms start an adjustment process of the capital-
labour ratio in response to that, choosing among the options available in the
3See Blanchard (1997 and 1998) and Caballero and Hammour (1997).
7technological menu, those less labor intensive; this reduces workers’ appropri-
ation possibilities through a reduction in employment O and brings back the
economy to the original VN schedule. The opposite happens when a positive
























Blanchard (1997 and 1998) provides a description of the dynamics of tran-
sition for an economy hit by labor demand and labor supply shocks under the
hypothesis of an elasticity of substitution between labor and capital equal or
greater than one; adjustment costs are characterized by a convex function that
is meant to approximate the eects of a putty-clay technology. In the next
paragraph we report Blanchard’s results and extend the analysis to the case
|| ? 1.
Consider initially, the case of an increase in . In the medium-run this
implies that the VN schedule is shifted down so that for the same capital-output
ratio the labor share decreases.
Look now at what happens in the short-run. ¯ O immediately decreases caus-
ing an increase in unemployment, in the capital share and in the proﬁt rate.
The latter element triggers capital accumulation and produces a full recover in
employment in the medium run.
At the end of the transition the economy ends up on a lower VN schedule
with a higher capital-output ratio. If ||  1 the outcome is unambiguous: the
labor share decreases; if instead, || ? 1 this is no more the case and the varia-
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If the markup instead decreases the economy will experience in the medium-
run an upward shift of the VN schedule; for any given n then, VO is now lower.
The short-run adjustment dynamics entail an increase in employment fol-
lowed by a decrease in the capital share and in the proﬁt rate. A capital decu-
mulation process starts due to that and along time this causes a return to the
previous employment level.
Eventually the economy ends up on a higher VN schedule with a lower
capital-output ratio. When ||  1 this means that the labor share increases; if






















Figure 4B: |ı| < 1, favourable labor demand shock
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Consider now what happens if a shock hits labor supply. Suppose for in-
stance, that trade unions gain power for some reason and that the parameter }
increase; for any given Z
S labor supply is now smaller. Given that the instanta-
9neous labor demand is vertical, the increase in the wage rate causes an increase
also in the labor-share, a fall in the proﬁt rate and in vu. The shift in the
relative price of labor induces ﬁrms to adopt more capital intensive technology
in response to increased rent appropriation by labor. This allows a recovery in
proﬁts.
When the capital deepening process is over, the transition ends and the
economy is left with a higher capital-output ratio; this means further that if
||  1 labor share is reduced. VO increases if instead, || ? 1. Opposite eects

































































Qualitatively similar results are obtained if the hypothesis of putty-clay tech-
nology is substituted with dierent forms of adjustment costs.
Giammarioli et al. (2002) for instance consider the role of ﬁring and hiring
costs in explaining the counter-cyclical behavior of the labor share over the
business cycle; the discounted value of these adjustment costs introduces a wedge
between marginal productivity of labor and the wage that ultimately aects the
actual level of the markup in the short run. In particular during a recession,
ﬁrms hoard labor and choose O in such a way that:
Z
S
(1 + )  $ = E · i
0
(o)








= E · i
0
(o)
The short run level of the markup then is:




and the VN schedule temporarily shifts upward.
Labour demand instead, rises by less than output during upswings because
the discounted value of ﬁring costs enters in the equation deﬁning labor market
equilibrium with a positive sign; the value of the markup then is vu =  + $ ·
S
Z A  and the VN schedule is temporarily shifted downward.
5.1 A Special Case: Transition Dynamics with Capital-
Augmenting Technological Progress
A special case of transition toward a dierent type of technology is described
in a recent paper by Acemoglu (2003) that develops a theoretical model where
ﬁrms adopt both labour and capital augmenting technologies through R&D ex-
penditures. Firm decision to invest in innovations that improve the e!ciency
of either type of factors depend on the relative prices of capital and labour in-
tensive intermediate goods. The R&D sector generates the relevant adjustment
costs.
Under the hypothesis of an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor smaller than one, it is possible to characterize a steady state equilibrium
where ﬁrm invest only in labor augmenting technological change and also the
value of the labor share is steady. In particular it is the case that on a balanced





where f is a positive constant. This is due to the fact that D does not vary
across time while capital accumulation and the growth rate of labor in e!ciency
unit are equal; this implies further that also o and n are constant.
In this context capital augmenting technological process is generated only
during the transition between dierent equilibria and as expected, produces a
permanent shift in the VN schedule. It comes out that dierent perturbations
aecting the economy have dierent eects on the labor share dynamics depend-
ing on which type of R&D investments they trigger; this marks a dierence with
the models considered up until now where adjustment costs have only temporary
eect on the VN schedule.
Consider more in detail the last issue. If an adverse labor supply shock
occurs, the economy moves temporarily along the VN schedule and then, returns
to the initial steady state equilibrium. In the short run indeed, as the wage
11increases, employment falls for a given level of capital stock thus reducing the
level of n and causing the labor share to increase. A decrease in the interest
rate occurs that slows down capital accumulation and provides incentives to the
R&D sector to improve the e!ciency of the labor stock.
The ratio D·N
E·O then, initially jumps because employment is reduced but
immediately starts to decrease since the growth rate of E exceeds that of N.
The transition is over when interest rate, capital accumulation, and the growth
rate of labor augmenting technical progress are back to their initial level. The
economy ends up with a lower employment level but with the same capital-labor
and capital-output ratios; since the adjustment process is driven by variations
in E that do not shift the VN schedule also the labor share returns to its long
run equilibrium level.
Consider now the case of a favorable shock that hits labor supply inducing
an increase in the employment level and in the interest rate; this supplies the
incentives for the R&D sector to invest in new intermediate goods that improve
the capital stock e!ciency. Initially then, the level of n drops together with the
capital-labor ratio causing a decrease in the labor share. During the transition
capital accumulation increases its pace and the growth rate of D is positive
resulting in an increase of the D·N
E·O ratio; as the interest rate decreases, also the
growth of the numerator slows down until it reaches the equilibrium level where
labor in e!ciency unit and the stock of capital grow at the same rate.
The adjustment process involves variations in D that shift the VN schedule;
the economy thus, ends up with higher employment level and a permanent
increase in the equilibrium level of the labor share.
6 Criticism and Improvements
The model introduced above provides a useful insight on labor share movements
but has been subject to some criticism. In particular the main drawback attains
the description of the wage setting process. Two objections have been raised.
The ﬁrst deals with the behavior of trade unions and the characterization
of the wage setting process. Rowthorn (1999) indeed points the fact that these
agents are myopic because discard the eect of wage setting over employment
decisions of individual ﬁrms; this leads to conclude that trade union objective
function is not well speciﬁed.
In his model, based on Layard et al. (1991), the previous author introduces
the assumption that trade unions care only about those workers that are insid-
ers at the time when the bargaining process takes place; this clearly marks a
dierence with the previous setting where, instead, they maximize the aggregate
utility of those who will be employed between two rounds of bargaining. A ﬁrst
consequence is that insider ”survival” probability (i.e. the probability that a
worker is not ﬁred by her present employer) becomes pivotal in the bargaining
process. The results in terms of labor share movements though do not dier
signiﬁcantly from those obtained in the standard setting when variations in the
capital-labor ratio are considered.
12Another work that considers explicitly individual ﬁrm behavior in the wage
setting process is the paper by Hornstein et al. (2007). These author introduce
some modiﬁcations in the benchmark Caballero and Hammour (1997) setting
to study the adjustment process involving the labor share when there is labor-
augmenting technical progress. In particular the focus is on the movement along
the VN schedule caused by labor market frictions depending on the regulatory
framework adopted in each economy; this is what previous author deﬁne the
technology-policy interaction.
The model combines the assumptions of a Leontief production function4
and of capital-embodied, labor-augmenting technical progress with a Diamond
- Mortensen - Pissarides matching function describing labor market functioning;
this latter element in particular, causes the outside option of ﬁrms and workers
in the Nash bargaining to become endogenous. In this setting an increase in the
rate of technological obsolescence (an acceleration in technical progress growth
rate) causes a drop in the labor share; the decrease follows from a reduction
in the value of workers’ outside option and from the simultaneous increase of
ﬁrms’ threat point. In economies characterized by small frictions in the labor
market the adjustment takes place both through variations in wage and unem-
ployment rate. In economies with consistent frictions the adjustment involves
mainly quantities causing an increase in unemployment duration and a fall in
the employment-vacancy ratio. In both cases the results are coherent with those
of a VN schedule characterized by a negative slope.
The second source of criticism points instead, on the e!ciency of the out-
comes generated by the right-to-manage speciﬁcation. The combination of em-
ployment and wage rate that results from the bargaining between workers and
ﬁrms indeed, is not on the contract curve and both could be better o choosing
a dierent solution. Several models did respond to this point by characterizing
the wage setting process as an asymmetric Nash bargaining over both the wage
rate and employment. The so called e!cient bargaining produces outcomes that
are a solution of the following maximization problem:
Pd{Z>O (Y  Y r)} (  r)
1}
It is easy to see that this formulation gets rid of the hypothesis that ﬁrms are
wage takers while taking employment decisions; this means further that even
if we consider a given level of the markup , a variation in workers bargaining
power results now in a shift of the VN schedule rather then in a movement along
it. In particular, the previous setting accounts for the circumstance where if
workers get stronger, they can obtain a larger share of production rents without
suering a decrease in employment.
There are then, compelling reasons to look closer at the determinants of the
relative position of workers and ﬁrms during the wage setting process; this is
precisely the aim of two recent papers by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and
by Jayadev (2007).
4In this setting though, there are no dierence in the technology menu available to indi-
vidual ﬁrms in the long and in the short run.
13The ﬁrst paper describes the eects of markets deregulation both in the short
and in the long run. In general equilibrium what marks the dierence between
the two situations is the total number of ﬁrms operating in the economy. No
entries indeed, are possible in the short-run while new comers enter the market in
the long-run paying a ﬁx cost h; the entry process deﬁnes the size of the markup
applied by individual ﬁrms in the goods market through the value of demand
elasticity. There is no capital in the economy and the production function of
ﬁrm l is simply
\l = Ql
where Ql is labor supply expressed in working hours. Labor marginal pro-
ductivity then is constant and equal to one. The previous setting is used to
study labor share movements in three dierent circumstances and namely after
a good market reform producing higher integration and a reduction in the entry
cost faced by potential entrants and after labor market deregulation reducing
workers bargaining power, }.
The ﬁrst two cases involve labor demand shocks aecting the size of the
markup and ultimately the amount of quasi-rents accruing to individual ﬁrms for
given level of }. The outcomes of the analysis in terms of labor share variations
are qualitatively similar to that described in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and
in Blanchard (1997 and 1998) when || A 1; the contribution of the paper is on
the side of the characterization of the transition that starts after the previous
shocks.
It is the case that higher market integration increases competition between
domestic and overseas ﬁrms and causes a rise in the price elasticity of demand, ,
driving down the markup. In the short run this causes as expected, an upward
shift in the VN schedule, an increase in the wage rate, in employment and in
the labor share. In the long run though the equilibrium level of  depends on
the entry cost (for given }); this means that after goods market deregulation the
total number of individual ﬁrms must decrease to allow a recover in the markup
that shifts back the VN schedule in its primitive position and causes VO to be
unchanged in the long run.
A regulatory intervention that reduces the level of h instead, produces a
permanent change in the equilibrium value of  and thus causes a shift in the
long run VN schedule. In particular, as the entry cost drops new ﬁrms enter
the market reducing progressively the markup and causing at the same time an
increase in the wage rate, in total employment and in the labor share.
Consider now what happens if labor market deregulation reduces perma-
nently workers bargaining power and expands ﬁrms opportunities to appropriate
the quasi-rents generated by the production process.
In the short run, the wage rate decreases, employment remains constant and
the labor share shrinks. The rise in the proﬁt rate that follows attracts new
entrants causing a decrease in .
In the long run equilibrium the shift in the VN schedule induced by the
drop in } is completely oset through the eects of a lower markup. Total
employment though increases, and so does labor share. A trade-o then arises
14between workers present condition and their future perspectives.
Also in this case then, the outcomes are similar to those obtained in the pre-
vious benchmark model when a favorable labor supply shock hits the economy
and || A 1.
The paper by Jayadev (2007) focus on the eects of one of the most relevant
aspects of the current globalization process: increased capital mobility; his work
is based on the model by Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) where in facts there is
no capital and ﬁrm mobility is assumed to be equivalent to capital mobility. In
this context the asymmetric Nash bargaining that deﬁnes the equilibrium wage
rate and employment level is modiﬁed to account for the option to relocate in
other countries that ﬁrm can exert in case no agreement is reached with workers.
The outcome of the process solves the following maximization problem:
Pd{Z>O (Y  Y r)} (  ! · )
1}
where  is the return from relocation and !  1, captures the eects of imperfect
capital mobility. The increase in the threat point of individual ﬁrms enhances
ﬁrm appropriation possibilities thus reducing the labor share and causing the
VN schedule to shift downward5.
Despite increased sophistication, it turns out that the simple model intro-
duced by Blanchard (1997 and 1998) supplies a reliable insight on labor share
movements if combined with the long run analyses provided by Bentolila and
Saint-Paul (2003). In this context, apart from changes in the technical features
of the production function (deriving both from capital augmenting labor supply
or by ﬂuctuations in the price of imported materials), labor market dynamics is
one of the main determinants of actual shifts in the VN schedule. In particular,
it is possible to identify two categories of factors responsible for that:
1. Globalization
2. Labor market regulatory framework
In the ﬁrst category we include the eects of both increased goods market
integration that, aects mainly labor demand, and increased capital and ﬁrms
mobility that aects labor supply by changing the relative bargaining power of
ﬁrms and workers.
The second category instead, stands for the regulatory framework that de-
ﬁnes the wage setting process and ultimately the characteristics of the labor
supply .
7 International Trade and the Labor Share
Up until now we did focus on a simpliﬁed economy where a unique good is
produced; this prevents to consider a relevant element in labor share dynamics,
5A slightly dierent setting where ﬁrm detain the right to manage employment level, Choi
(2001) obtains similar results considering the role of foreign direct investments. In this set-
ting foreign direct investments supply more opportunity of increasing proﬁt level abroad and
increase ﬁrm bargaining power.
15i.e. variations in international trade patterns.
In spite of its relevance for the analysis, it is not easy to deﬁne a clear rela-
tionship between international trade and labor share movements. Referring to
models with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition or to models
that focus on intraﬁrm dierences in productivity and export within industries
we incur into major problems; quoting Krugman (2008) indeed ”It is not clear
however, how to apply the insights of either sets of ideas to the question of
distributional eects of developing-country exports”.
We need then, to appeal to the traditional models of perfectly competitive
markets to recover this piece of informations. In particular, the Heckscher-Ohlin
model supplies some unambiguous predictions over the determinants of labor
share dynamics, when speciﬁc hypothesis are introduced.
Provided that we assume that developed countries are capital abundant, in a
simple model with two goods and two factors, they specialize in the production
of capital intensive goods6; an increase in trade with labor abundant devel-
oping countries then, leads to the decrease in the international price of labor
intensive goods and to the reduction in the labor share predicted by the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem7. The validity of the initial assumption is questioned by
several studies starting from the seminal contribution of Leontief (1953), but no
decisive argument is provided against it.
A wider agreement exists on the statement that developed countries are
abundant in human capital and export mainly skill-intensive goods and import
less sophisticated goods from developing countries. If this is the case, an increase
in international trade causes the labor share of unskilled workers to shrink and
that of skilled workers to increase.
Several authors studied the eects of fragmentation, oshoring and outsourc-
ing in the production process that follows from globalization adopting oftentimes
modiﬁed versions of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model8.Gaining some insight
over the dynamics of the labor share from their results though is not an easy
task. Most of these studies indeed, aim primarily to provide a rationale for the
observed increased wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers; it is not
always straightforward then, to derive unambiguous predictions on the dynam-
ics of the labor share even if some of them could be re-framed using labor and
capital instead. A second set of problems derives from the fact that the results
are sometimes contradictory9.
The previous di!culties suggest to limit the analysis to the well established
results obtained in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
It is possible to get some insight from a simple model with two sectors, 1
and 2, producing respectively a skill intensive good and a non-skill-intensive
6See the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem whose sources are Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933).
7See Stolper and Samuelson (1941).
8See for instance, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Arndt (1997), Feenstra and Han-
son (1996).
9A general tractation of this issue is attempted by Kohler (2003) whose general results can
explain the dynamics in the remuneration of any productive factor.
16good, and two productive factors, skilled (v) and unskilled (x) labor10; in this
framework international trade leads to the equalization in good prices and more
speciﬁcally causes the price of skill-intensive good, s1, to increase in developed
countries while that of the other good, s2, decreases. The reverse happens in
developing countries that are characterized by abundance in non-skilled workers.
Consider now the dynamics of the labor share and analyze the equations
that deﬁne the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem11. Variations in the unit cost and
hence in the price of each commodity are a weighted average of the changes in
the two factor prices (Zv and Zx); the weights, m>l (m = v>x, l = 1>2) are the
distributive shares of the two factors in the sector concerned and a circumﬂex
denotes a proportional change:
v>1 ˆ Zv + x>1 ˆ Zx = ˆ s1
v>2 ˆ Zv + x>2 ˆ Zx = ˆ s2
Summing the two equations allows getting the variation in the average wage:
ˆ Z = v>1 ˆ Zv + x>1 ˆ Zx + v>2 ˆ Zv + x>2 ˆ Zx = ˆ s1 + ˆ s2
Since there is full employment, it is the case that when ˆ s1+ˆ s2 ? 0 holds, the
aggregate labor share shrinks; if instead, ˆ s1 + ˆ s2  0, the labor share increases.
In developed countries then, whenever the proportional increase in the price
of the skill-intensive good exceeds the proportional decrease in the price of the
other good, international trade has a positive impact over the labor share. The
reverse is true otherwise.
A description of the pattern of trade between developed and developing
countries then, is required to sort through the previous sets of assumptions and
to deﬁne which one ﬁts better to real world circumstances. A recent paper by
Krugman (2008) provides an accurate overview of the evolution of trade dividing
the last thirty years in three distinct periods.
When the international trade pattern in the 70s is considered, a good approx-
imation is a situation where developing countries export mainly primary goods
and capital-abundant, developed countries specialize in manufactured goods.
During the 80s, the weight of manufactured goods on total export from devel-
oping countries increases and country specialization is mainly deﬁned by the
relative endowment of human capital, i.e. skilled labor.
The period from 1980 to circa 2005 is split in two. In a ﬁrst phase interna-
tional trade is characterized by limited volumes and involves mainly countries
whose wage gap with developed countries is wide but not extreme; exports from
developing economies moreover, involves mainly non-sophisticated goods, i.e. it
is concentrated in the less skill-intensive sectors.
After the late 90s a major transformation in international trade pattern is
observed. Export volumes from developing countries face a steep increase while
10If we assume perfect international markets and perfect mobility of capital, no country can
be capital abundant and the rental price must be the same across countries.
11See Jones and Neary (1984).
17new actors appear on the scene, China on top of the list, that are substantially
lower wage than before. Besides, the sophistication of exported goods increases
and involves also skill-intensive sectors, in particular, the electronic industry.
This apparently puzzling evidence has risen a debate over the true nature
of the observed increased export sophistication of developing countries. A ﬁrst
view supported by Lawrence (2008), considers the previous piece of informations
as a sign of an actual transformation of the pattern of international trade.
Krugman (2008) argues instead, that it is just a statistical illusion due to a
lack of detailed data on the factor contents of trade.
According to Krugman’s interpretation of existing informations on special-
ization within industries and in particular, vertical specialization, developing
countries are taking over labor-intensive portions of skill-intensive sectors; no
qualitative change is occurring then, in the pattern of trade between devel-
oped and developing economies whose specialization remain respectively in skill-
intensive goods and in labor-intensive goods.
Summing up, providing a description of the eects of international trade over
the labor share represents an hard task and requires a non-trivial simpliﬁcation
of the analysis; nonetheless some general conclusions can be drawn based on the
description of trade pattern by Krugman (2008).
During the 70s, international trade is likely to aect negatively the labor
share of developed country whose abundant factor is capital, and positively that
of developing countries. In the next decade variations in the labor share depend
upon the changes in the relative prices of skill-intensive and non-skill-intensive
goods.
The same relation drives also its dynamics in recent years if Krugman’s
statement over the evolution of the pattern of trade is deemed correct; in this
context the steep increase in the wage gap and in the volumes of trade are likely
to aect negatively the labor share of developed countries. No clear predictions
are derived from the theory if instead, the thesis of Lawrence (2008) is adopted.
8 Final Remarks
The VN schedule provides a useful framework to analyze labor share dynamics
and to deﬁne the causes of its ﬂuctuations. These can be classiﬁed into four
categories:
• Technology related factors
• Factors related to the institutional design of the economy
• Change in prices
In the ﬁrst category are placed the eects induced by labor and capital
augmenting technical progress which are responsible respectively of long run
movement along the VN schedule and of permanent displacements of it.
The second class includes instead, all those factors that in the short and in
the medium run deﬁne the size of the rents accruing to ﬁrms and how they are
18subsequently divided between labor and capital remuneration. This is also the
ambit where policy can eectively intervene to sustain the labor share growth
reducing ﬁrms bargaining power and managing the negative eects introduced
by globalization.
The last class includes both the variation in the relative price of factors
deriving by shocks hitting ﬁnancial market, or the economy endowment of labour
and capital, and by change in the international prices of imported intermediate
goods and of exported ﬁnal goods and services.
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